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Debate
The ‘Populist’ Right Challenge to Neoliberalism: Social
Policy between a Rock and a Hard Place
James Putzel
ABSTRACT
This article looks at the rise of right populist politics in both developed and
developing countries, and its implications for social policy. The author lo-
cates the cause for the right populist surge in the legacies of neoliberalism,
paying particular attention to the way neoliberal reforms have affected pop-
ular attitudes towards politics. The commodification of politics and social
services has stoked mass cynicism towards reigning neoliberal elites, cre-
ating receptive audiences for populist slogans to ‘drain the swamp’ at the
heart of governments. More controversially, the author argues that popular
resentments toward neoliberal social policies based on the recognition of the
rights of women, minorities, migrants and the poor have made communi-
ties susceptible to the racist and misogynist messages of the right populists.
Through case studies looking at the United States, Brazil and the Philippines
the author argues that the biggest impact of right populists on social poli-
cies can be found in their discourses and authoritarian practices of social
exclusion.
INTRODUCTION
In the 2010s there appeared a palpable shift in politics internationally, at
first hard to detect and suddenly omnipresent, at least in the rich and middle-
income countries. A new set of right ‘populist’ actors emerged challeng-
ing the status quo, using social media to capture the imaginations and re-
spond to the grievances and alienation of populations in both developing
and developed countries. In the Philippines, the United States (US), Italy,
Brazil and the United Kingdom (UK), political ‘outliers’, who often present
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themselves as ‘outsiders’, succeeded in upsetting long-established ways of
doing politics, sidestepping or changing conventional political norms and
gaining political power. In its divisive discourse and policies towards the
poor, minorities and women, the ‘new’ politics of the right threatens to
undermine the already commoditized social policy regimes that have char-
acterized the ‘neoliberal era’ since the early 1980s.
Can there be any sense in labelling as practitioners of ‘right populist
politics’ political currents as disparate as those led in developing countries
by the likes of President Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines and President Jair
Bolsonaro in Brazil, and in developed countries by President Donald Trump
in the US and Matteo Salvini in Italy, to name but a few? These are leaders
with very distinct programmes, notably on social policy, tailored to appeal to
national constituencies and anchored in national political histories. They, and
many other similar actors emerging as challengers vying for state power in
recent years, operate in both new political movements as well as established
political parties, including both parties that have held government power
in the past and those that have been operating at the ‘fringes’ of political
systems until relatively recently. By ‘fringes’ we mean both those on the
political extremes and those that have had a very narrow geographical base
of support, which in the past appeared to have little prospect of gaining
national leadership or state power.
What makes them ‘populists’? First, populist leaders appeal directly to
their constituents, passing over the heads of traditional instances of polit-
ical intermediation, including the organizational hierarchies of established
political parties and media organizations where programmes and policies
have traditionally been scrutinized against independent sources of evidence.
Secondly, they classically claim to speak for, and personify the interests of,
‘ordinary people’ against established elites (even when these leaders often
emerge from elites themselves), and they condemn those who disagree as
somehow not genuinely ‘of the people’. Thirdly, they tell people what they
want to hear, often appealing to popular beliefs, prejudices, anxieties and
fears, without the need to anchor their programmes or policies in scientific or
expert knowledge. Fourthly, these leaders commonly portray themselves as
‘outsiders’ to established politics (often they have re-invented themselves as
outsiders), but more often they are ‘outliers’ — members of fringe minority
factions of established political parties or political organizations that have
hitherto operated only on the margins of established political systems.
We eschew the use of ‘populism’ as it denotes a coherent ideological ori-
entation and a set of shared ideas and beliefs.1 The term ‘populist’ refers to a
1. Historically, there have been distinct political-ideological currents of ‘Populism’ identified
with the political left, for instance in the late 19th century in both Russia (Berlin, 1960: vii–
viii) and the United States (Peffer, 1893: 678). In recent years, Argentinian political theorist
Ernesto Laclau (2005) has reclaimed ‘Populism’ as a radical people-centred ideology,
inspiring leaders like Pablo Iglesias in Spain (Errejo´n, 2014; Errejo´n and Mouffe, 2016).
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‘way of doing politics’, which can be, and historically has been, practised on
both the left and the right (Conniff, 2012: 5). In recent years, leaders on the
political left could also be said to practise populist politics, like former Pres-
idents Evo Morales and Rafael Correa in developing countries and Bernie
Sanders, Jeremy Corbyn and Pablo Iglesias in developed countries. Here we
are concerned with understanding those practising populist politics of the
right, who have already achieved state power, and the likely impact they may
have on social policy, not least because they have been far more successful
in challenging dominant neoliberal political authorities than populists on the
left.
The ‘right populist’ movements of today draw on deeply rooted ideas on
the political right about the market and society that pre-date neoliberalism.2
Those who have attempted to understand the social policy of the new right
movements in Europe and North America have failed to discern the differ-
ences between them and the reigning neoliberal order.3 This is not surprising
because the right populists and neoliberals share a commitment to market
fundamentalism, or economic liberalism. Where right populists have come
to power, they have for the most part maintained the ‘market friendly’ social
policies of neoliberalism, but have had their biggest impact on social pol-
icy by weakening the rights of minorities and women and sowing division
among the poor.
The defining characteristics of ‘neoliberalism’ remain contested (Chang,
2002; Thorsen, 2010; Venugopal, 2015). However, there is general agree-
ment that a major shift occurred in the dominant economic thinking and
policies within the capitalist world with the Reagan–Thatcher revolution of
the early 1980s, which can be said to have launched the first phase of neolib-
eralism that lasted until the early 1990s. Neoliberalism has been defined by
a commitment to limit state intervention in and regulation of markets, to cre-
ate flexible labour markets thus limiting the power of trade unions, to limit
state social spending and to promote, where possible, private sector delivery
of services (like health, education, water, energy, transportation and, at the
extremes, domestic security including policing and prisons). The right pop-
ulists of today do not diverge significantly from these positions, which after
all were born of the philosophies of Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek
and Milton Friedman, whose laissez-faire economics are the holy grail of
2. In this contribution to the Debate, the term ‘right populist’ rather than ‘right-wing populism’
is purposefully used to emphasize the point that populist politics today is a way of doing
politics and not an ideology with right and left wings. These are actors operating in the
long tradition of the political right, the lineage of which is traced from its origins in the
wake of the French Revolution to the present neoliberal era in the works of Steven Lukes
(2003/2008) and Roger Eatwell (1989).
3. Fenger (2018) provides a good summary of this work. In an early article on the topic,
Betz (1993: 423) in fact argued that a defining feature of radical right parties was their
‘pronounced neo-liberal programme’.
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the modern political right. They diverge instead over three further central
features of the neoliberal order.
First, where neoliberals have prioritized global markets, the right pop-
ulists favour domestic markets. Second, the right populists oppose the rights
agenda that emerged during what Fine and Saad-Filho (2017) called the
‘mature phase’ of neoliberalism. A final area of sharp divergence of the
new right from reigning neoliberalism involves the authoritarian character
of these political movements. While neoliberals skewed laws in favour of
capital and the rich against labour and the poor, they were generally in
favour of the rule of law. There is a distinct authoritarian trend among the
right populists towards a toleration of heavy-handed police and vigilante
action against the ‘criminal poor’.
The central argument of this contribution to the Debate is that these new
rightists are making their biggest impact on social policy in both developed
and developing countries through discourses and actions that promote social
exclusion. They undermine struggles for more just and universal social
policies by dividing society between ‘native majorities’ and ethnic, religious
or migrant minorities. They divide the poor between the ‘deserving’ and
‘undeserving’ or even the ‘criminal’, in the worst cases legitimizing vigilante
actions of majority communities against minorities. Their legitimation of
misogynist and racist discourse threatens to undermine progress made over
the past few decades towards recognizing the rights of women and ethnic
and religious minorities. On a wider level their tendency to reject scientific
evidence, to attack independent media, to question judicial independence
and to reject multilateral international rules and organizations, threatens the
arenas in which people have fought for and won more progressive social
policies in the past.
The first part of the article discusses how reigning neoliberalism has
created the conditions for the rise of right populist politics. There is con-
siderable recognition that right populist movements have thrived on popular
anger caused by the economic impact of neoliberal globalization. Much less
attention has been paid to the political legacies of neoliberalism. These
have not only created deep cynicism towards the state and established
political parties, but also popular animosity towards the rights won by
women and minorities that have partly shaped social policies during the
neoliberal era. The second part of the article takes up three case stud-
ies chosen because they include both developed and developing countries
where right populists have succeeded in gaining power: the Philippines, the
United States and Brazil. It examines their often-contradictory moves on
social policy since coming to office and how their authoritarian inclinations
and their divisive approach to the poor, women and minorities affect ac-
tions on social policy. The conclusion sums up the challenges presented
by the rise of these new movements, particularly in the domain of social
policy.
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NEOLIBERAL LEGACY AND THE RISE OF THE POPULISTS: ECONOMY,
POLITICS AND SOCIAL POLICY
The economic legacy of neoliberalism has figured prominently in many dis-
cussions of the rise of right populist politics, but there has been much less
attention accorded to its political legacies and the way ‘mature neoliber-
alism’ redefined social policy as delivery of services to ‘customers’. The
commodification of politics and social services may have been even more
potent in rendering populations in most developed countries and middle-
income countries in the developing world vulnerable to the messages of
right populists than the economic legacy of neoliberalism. In this section we
examine the economic, political and social policy legacies of neoliberalism
that have created a fertile terrain for right populist politics.
The Return of Extreme Levels of Inequality
The reforms unleashed by the Reagan–Thatcher revolution of the early 1980s
undid much of the redistributive fiscal and social policies that had charac-
terized the ‘New Deal’ and post-World War II era. They led, after nearly
four decades, to an enormous increase in inequality in most developed and
developing countries. With tax cuts, expanded opportunities for investment
in low-wage economies and for speculation in financial markets and almost
unlimited opportunities for luxury consumption, the top 1 per cent of in-
come earners in the developed countries captured an ever increasing share
of income within their countries (Galbraith, 2002; Milanovic, 2003; Palma,
2009, 2011; Piketty, 2014). Through processes of privatization of state as-
sets, trade liberalization, the radical curtailment of trade union rights, the
promotion of flexible labour markets and the deregulation of finance, the
reforms were designed to unleash the potential of markets to deliver eco-
nomic growth. By encouraging finance to move much more freely around
the globe, the reforms saw the destruction of many old industrial activities
and communities in the developed counties.
This pattern of globalization saw the bifurcation of the developing coun-
tries. Those that had states capable of launching export-oriented industrial-
ization (most remarkably so among the ‘developmental states’ in East Asia)
benefited. The majority of developing countries, where moves towards in-
dustrialization were arrested or even set in reverse (Arrighi, 2002; Easterly,
2001; Mkandawire, 2005; Palma, 2003: 134–36), suffered.
Trade liberalization, the privatization of state assets and fiscal reforms
favouring the owners of wealth allowed elites to maintain their position,
or greatly improve it, with opportunities in the globalized economy. Even
as growth returned after the millennium, it was founded either in the ser-
vice sector or primary commodities trade, with limited expansion of manu-
facturing or agricultural production. The impact of post-1980 neoliberal
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reforms benefited the wealthy and the upper-middle classes, whose num-
bers expanded with growth in the service sector. However, lower-middle
classes and workers in the formal sector, especially those whose families
once had employment in the public sector or in embryonic manufactur-
ing, as well as poor farmers and farmworkers, enjoyed fewer benefits from
neoliberal reforms (Petras, 1999). Already high levels of inequality were
either frozen or worsened (World Inequality Lab, 2018). There has been a
rapid process of urbanization in many lower- and middle-income countries,
but it has been urbanization without industrialization, seeing a vast expan-
sion of informal economic activities as well as increased levels of crime
(World Bank, 2017).
The financial crisis of 2007–08 marked a turning point in public aware-
ness, particularly in the rich countries, about the extent of inequality that
had evolved in the decades of accelerated globalization. The measures taken
to avoid economic meltdown after the financial crisis hardly had an impact
on the privileged position of the beneficiaries of globalization. The pattern
of unequal distribution of the benefits of globalization, experienced to dif-
fering degrees among the developed and developing countries, contributed
enormously to the sense of alienation and anger felt by old working class
communities, small business owners and much of the middle class in the
rich countries, and the lower-middle class and worker and farmer families in
middle-income countries of the developing world (Koo, 2016; MGI, 2016).
The sharp rise in inequality and the destruction of old sites of stable indus-
trial employment that had accompanied globalization and the financialization
of capitalism, led to widespread popular resentment in both developed coun-
tries and middle-income countries in the developing world, and this provided
a fertile terrain for the rise of right populist politics.
Vilification of the State and Politics: Social Policy as Service Delivery
to Customers
The political legacies of neoliberalism, which involved the commodification
of politics and social services, have led to widespread popular cynicism to-
wards established political elites, rendering societies much more susceptible
to the demagogic politics of the populist right. During the decades of neolib-
eral dominance there was the promotion of an entire intellectual architecture
that modelled public authority, or the realm of the state, as a site of indi-
vidual self-seeking behaviour, prone to rent seeking and corruption, as well
as ‘free riding’ and inefficiency. The ‘rational choice’ theory evolved from
neoclassical economics came to occupy a prominent place in the study of
states and politics.4 Criticisms were mounted toward the direct participation
4. McClean (2017) demonstrates the extent to which James Buchanan and his ‘public choice
school’ were purposefully financed by big business in the United States.
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of the state in economic activity; thus prescriptions of privatization of public
assets and ‘outsourcing’ of administrative activities and ‘contracting out’
of service delivery were widely promoted in both the developed and de-
veloping countries. Analytical and prescriptive frameworks of ‘New Public
Management’ were promoted with the objective of increasing efficiency in
redirected public agencies (Hood, 1991).
This was not only a change in the way public authority was concep-
tualized, but actually a profound transformation in how states were orga-
nized and in the behaviour of both administrative and political authori-
ties. States became ‘service providers’ and citizens became ‘customers’.
The practice of politics also significantly changed as voters too were cus-
tomers in the ‘political marketplace’. Notions of public administration as
sites of ‘public service’ and politics as a ‘vocation’ were displaced by ra-
tional actor models, which increasingly informed organizational design and
measurements of success and failure. The same occurred in what was pre-
viously known as the ‘voluntary sector’ re-invented as ‘non-governmental
organizations’ (NGOs) that became increasingly ‘professionalized’ and or-
ganized along the same lines. Whole new ‘for profit’ businesses devel-
oped to carry out what once was considered the provision of public ser-
vices. While political lobbying activities had long existed, a new sector
of political lobbying firms emerged from the 1980s in Washington DC,
spreading to political capitals around the world. The wholesale commod-
ification of state and political activities became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Former prime ministers and presidents, senior politicians and administra-
tors came to command hitherto unheard-of salaries after leaving public
office or public service, not least on the boards of financial organizations
and lobby firms.5 They joined the ranks of ‘globalized elites’, symbolized
so appositely in the annual meetings of the World Economic Forum in
Davos.
In a world of growing economic inequality, where people feel betrayed by
established political parties, it is understandable that they have responded
enthusiastically to the right populists’ calls to ‘drain the swamp’ of privileged
elites at the heart of governments run on neoliberal principles.
Social Policy in the ‘Mature’ Phase of Neoliberalism: Market-friendly
Individual Rights
More controversially, the neoliberals’ approach to social policy, based on
granting rights to the poor, minorities and women, has created reserves of
resentment among middle-class and working people who have experienced
5. Reports abound in the media of the exorbitant fees for public appearances charged by the
likes of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton. See, for instance, ‘Blair Paid $500,000 for 20-minute
Talk’, Financial Times 8 November 2007.
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a decline in their own economic prospects. It is at least partly by stoking
this resentment that right populists have built mass followings in recent
years. During the second phase of neoliberalism, roughly from the mid-
1990s, new attention was devoted to responding to civil society actors,
already cowed by neoliberal authorities, who advocated reforms to alleviate
the devastating economic and social impact of early neoliberal pro-market
reforms (Fine and Saad-Filo, 2017: 695). In the domain of international
development, on top of the hard-line prescriptions for structural adjustment
and the social protest they generated, moves were made to make pro-market
strategies more palatable. This involved the launching of ‘Voices of the
Poor’, the turn to institutions and ‘good governance’, the endorsement of
‘human development’, ‘poverty reduction strategy papers’, ‘mainstreaming
gender’ and eventually the Millennium Development Goals, followed by the
Sustainable Development Goals.
It was this evolution during phase two neoliberalism that came to define
social policy for the neoliberal era. Targets for poverty reduction, gender
equity, access to health and education were to be achieved through aid
and domestically funded targeted programmes with such delivery tools as
conditional cash transfers (CCTs), none of which contradicted the market-
oriented nature of neoliberal strategies. Saad-Filho (2015: 1227) documents
the successfulness of the original CCT, the Programa Bolsa Famı´lia in Brazil,
in providing ‘substantial income support to the poorest’, but he argues that
long-term and widespread progress would have required ‘universalization
and de-commodification of social provision’.
The changes in the development framework and the evolution of social
policy under phase two neoliberalism were designed to cushion, but not
undermine, the financialization of capitalism and were functional to the con-
solidation of the neoliberal order. In fact, these changes could be understood
as a great triumph of neoliberalism since phase two, which roughly began in
the early 1990s, corresponded to the final surrender of social democracy to
the hegemonic neoliberal project. In country after country, social democratic
parties and thinkers (Giddens, 1998), accepted the edict of TINA (‘there is
no alternative’) and the logic of neoliberalism. This was when Tony Blair
and Gordon Brown and their ‘New Labour’ party in the UK, Bill Clinton’s
Democratic Party in the US and Gerhard Schro¨der’s Social Democratic
Party in Germany not only surrendered to the reigning ideology by adopting
it (with its softer ‘third way’ face), but actively implemented the agenda of
phase two neoliberalism.
This evolution in neoliberal social policy was related at a deeper level
to the move among neoliberal-dominated states to recognize a panoply
of social and political rights, as long as such a move would further the
consolidation of markets. Nancy Fraser (2009) demonstrated the ways in
which ‘second wave feminism’, in its far-reaching critique of the patri-
archal character of post-World War II state-managed capitalism, was ac-
commodated and used to extend rights to women that facilitated their
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participation in labour markets and patterns of social reproduction con-
sistent with the neoliberal project. Other feminist theorists and social sci-
entists dispute such an interpretation, either by underlining gains of women
in the process or insisting on the deleterious impact of neoliberalism on
women and the feminist cause (Eschle and Maiguashca, 2018; Wilson,
2015; Yoo, 2011). However, the point is that the decades of neoliberal
dominance saw a widespread increase in women’s participation in the work-
place, the development of microcredit programmes that shifted women’s
position in the power dynamics of households, programmes for women to
access family planning and new legal measures (of course differentially
achieved across countries) to formally target sexual harassment, gender dis-
crimination in the workplace and violence against women (World Bank,
2019).
Kymlicka (2013) provides a similar argument about the pattern of recog-
nition of ethnic minority rights and what he ends up calling ‘neoliberal
multiculturalism’. While during the early days of neoliberalism, there was
a widespread rejection of multiculturalism as overly state interventionist,
over time there was an increasing enthusiasm among political authorities to
endorse multicultural practices. This was in part a response to civil society
organizations demanding recognition of ethnic rights and an end to discrim-
ination, but it also became clear that the implementation of multiculturalism
advanced the consolidation of markets everywhere. He documents how the
World Bank became a strong advocate in the early 1990s on the grounds
that ethnicity is a source of social capital, which enables deeper market
participation. This was manifested differently in terms of indigenous ethnic
groups and immigrants: ‘Immigrant transnationalism, then, is an asset in
an increasingly global marketplace — it facilitates global trade’ (Kymlicka,
2013: 110).
In the developed countries, the widespread practice of recognizing the
individual rights of women, ethnic minorities and immigrants, and the asso-
ciated ‘political correctness’ adopted by reigning political elites, has likely
contributed as much to the rise of right populist politics as the patterns
of income inequality unleashed by neoliberalism. Working-class and many
middle-class families saw their worlds of work and their communities evis-
cerated by globalization. On top of this, white working-class men saw their
traditional position of authority over women, their ‘superiority’ over ethnic
minorities and the unorganized poor put into question by the recognition of
these rights, creating widespread feelings of resentment against liberal elites
in power.
In middle-income developing countries, where workers, farmers and
lower-middle-class people suffered from neoliberal structural adjustment
and financial stabilization programmes, elites had opportunities to main-
tain or even increase their wealth and status in the globalized economy. By
the time that phase two neoliberalism emerged, elites endorsed the ‘rights-
granting’ practices that accompanied new programmes of ‘good governance’
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and ‘institutional reform’ financed in large measure by foreign aid. Neolib-
eral social policy programmes were geared towards the ‘poorest of the poor’,
with much less attention to urban workers, lower-middle-class families in
the urban service sector, or rural farmers.
As growth slowly picked up, fast-expanding urbanization without industri-
alization saw a proliferation of criminal activities in cities in situations where
policing budgets were weak, not least because of the low tax efforts and re-
gressive patterns of taxation. Crime was experienced differently by elites and
upper-middle-class people in urban gated communities than by those who
lived in more open city neighbourhoods. International development agencies
and NGOs, backed by national governments, elite philanthropic initiatives
and the growing numbers of middle-class professionals with permanent jobs
in the NGOs, propagated ideas of gender equality, social inclusion and the
due process of law. But in many countries pro-poor programmes and the
recognition of social rights rang hollow among the lower-middle class and
the working urban and rural poor, particularly as they experienced rising lev-
els of income inequality, crime and daily hardship from the lack of adequate
transport and other public services.
Right populist politics in both rich and middle-income countries have
mobilized popular support among those angered by what they see as hypo-
critical liberal elites in government. Many of the hard-won gains made by
women, minorities and the poor were achieved in negotiations between civil
society organizations and state officials, rather than through widespread
social movements, so in many cases there was little sign of a deep social
consensus, or social transformation, over the rights won. Neoliberal elites
presided over new forms of ‘political correctness’ when it came to minority
and gender rights, but it is questionable how far these changes have been
internalized by ordinary people in society.
In sum, the market-oriented policies neoliberals have pursued have led
to widespread popular anger over exacerbated economic inequality and
the destruction of jobs, communities and social aspirations. The neolib-
eral reorganization of the state and politics as sites of purely self-interested
behaviour and the accompanying commodification of social services have
greatly increased the cynicism of populations towards public authority and
established political organizations, making them willing audiences for calls
to ‘drain the swamp’. The social rights and social policy agenda of ‘ma-
ture’ neoliberalism, which recognized the rights of women, minorities and
immigrants and targeted social programmes to them, as long as they were
consistent with the promotion of markets, has been perceived by many
people not only as unfair, but as an assault against traditional norms. By
the early 2010s, in the wake of the financial crisis, all this has made the
lower and middle classes feel insecure even in their homes and communi-
ties, creating widespread receptiveness to the divisive messages of the right
populists.
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POPULISTS IN POWER: AUTHORITARIAN, MISOGYNIST AND ATWAR
WITH THE ‘UNDESERVING POOR’
The political outliers (and outsiders) deploying populist politics of the right
who have achieved power at the national and sub-national levels in the
2010s have all done so with promises to rid the state of ‘liberal’, ‘global-
ized’ and ‘corrupt’ elites and to use state power to promote the interests
of hard-working deserving native citizens. In what seems almost a mas-
terful ‘confidence trick’, they have come to power backed by alliances of
business interests often promoting greater deregulation of domestic markets
than the neoliberals before them. In their campaigns for political power, the
right populists did not promise expansive social programmes. Instead, they
sought to win support by demonizing the ‘undeserving poor’, whether they
were ‘illegal immigrants’, ‘dangerous Muslims’, ‘lazy’ or ‘criminal’ poor,
portrayed as having received unfair assistance or protection by liberal elites
in the past. Once in power the right populist governments discussed here
have taken different official stands on specific social policies, ranging from
cutting back the social programmes of their predecessors, as in the US, a
combination of reluctant maintenance of some neoliberal programmes with
deeper cuts in social spending than their predecessors could achieve, as in
Brazil, and even the passage of some universalist measures with no clear
plan of how to fund them, as in the Philippines.
However, the biggest impact on social policy by the right populists since
coming to power has been through the pursuit of agendas of social exclusion
directed against the ‘undeserving’ poor and their attempt to roll back the
gains made by women in fighting for their rights during recent decades.
Their authoritarian drift, empowering the police, challenging judicial inde-
pendence and attacking independent media, threatens to silence their political
opponents and civil society. Their worst impact on prospects for the pursuit
of progressive social policy in the future is the way they have legitimized
discourses of hatred towards minorities and women, aided by a rejection of
international standards and norms.
While the fundamental reasons for the rapid rise of right populist politics
are located in neoliberal legacies, the speed with which they have gained
prominence has been greatly facilitated by the technical revolution in infor-
mation and communications technology and the expansive reach of social
media. Although it was probably Barak Obama’s earlier campaign for the
White House that demonstrated how social media could be harnessed for
political purposes by established political parties (Bimber, 2014), the na-
ture of this new media has proven to be particularly suitable to the type
of politics pursued by the right populists. Not only has this explosion al-
lowed political actors to transmit their messages directly to people’s mobile
phones, but it has allowed them to shape the news people hear, read and see
and therefore influence public opinion to a greater extent than ever before
(ITU, 2018). Unvetted and unregulated, the media has lent itself to the often
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demagogic and hateful politics pursued by right populists, allowing them
both to leapfrog gatekeepers in established political organizations and in the
traditional media, while forcing themselves onto the agenda of mainstream
media in the process. From positions of power, social media has proven to
be the preferred method of communication for all these politicians.
Politics of Social Exclusion and Implications for Social Policy
In the Philippines, unlike in the US and Brazil, after coming to power Presi-
dent Rodrigo Duterte endorsed at least formal legislation towards ‘universal
provisions’ on free university fees, minimum incomes, social pensions and
national health, but the latter two have yet to be provided with meaningful
funding. However, Duterte’s violent anti-drugs campaign has amounted to
a radical form of social exclusion by literally gunning down thousands of
poor people.
Duterte won the presidency in 2016, successfully deploying social me-
dia as a political outlier with a reputation for having secured ‘order’ (often
by sidestepping law) and development in his many years as mayor of the
southern city of Davao. There, he was known for having used armed vigi-
lante groups to stamp out crime by summarily killing criminals, particularly
among the urban poor (Breuilm and Rozema, 2009). He promised to sweep
away corruption in the central government in Manila, long controlled by
trapos (a shortened form for ‘traditional politicians’, which also means ‘old
dirty rag’ in Tagalog). Duterte’s populist politics were clearly anchored in
the shifting coalitions of non-party politics that have characterized a po-
litical system where old (and new) wealthy clans traditionally dominated.
Like in the US and Brazil, Duterte’s movement divided the poor, in this
case, between the hard-working honest poor and the criminal drug users,
and appealed to middle-class urban voters preoccupied with rising crime
and wholly inadequate public infrastructure. Indeed, it was by transcending
voting blocs mainly based on regional lines and winning the urban vote right
across the archipelago that Duterte captured the presidency (Putzel, 2016).
True to his word, upon assuming office Duterte unleased a ‘war against
drugs’ that, according to official sources, by June 2019 had killed between
5,375 and 6,600 drug ‘suspects’, mostly from among the urban poor (Rap-
pler, 2019). This has involved a succession of operations by the Philippine
National Police initially concentrated in urban poor communities in the cap-
ital but later moving out to other urban centres, where police have said
criminals were gunned down while resisting arrest. But since the start, there
have been widespread reports that the numbers killed are much higher and
many by armed vigilantes working informally for the police (Amnesty Inter-
national, 2019; CHRP, 2018; UNODC, 2016). The drug war has been carried
out in a macabre fashion disseminating fear throughout poor communities
(UNHRC, 2019). Beyond this, while Duterte first assumed office inviting
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nominations from the Communist Party of the Philippines to his cabinet and
reinstating peace talks with them, soon the peace talks were off and all those
from the Left that joined were moved out, with subsequent appointments to
cabinet being drawn overwhelmingly from the military.6 Although he has
secured total control over both chambers of the Congress through mid-term
elections in 2019, he has still felt compelled to denounce regularly leading
members of the opposition and pursue them in the courts.
While Duterte has unleashed a war against the criminal poor, he has
maintained the neoliberal social policies of his predecessors, even introduc-
ing some universalist programmes. Soon after coming to power, Duterte
signed a law guaranteeing universal free access to college and universities.7
His government has maintained support for the conditional cash transfer
programme, known as the ‘4 Ps’ begun by his predecessors (Orbeta and
Paqueo, 2016). Legislation has been passed to move toward an expansion of
social pensions, but so far implemented only for military veterans. Further
legal moves have been made to introduce universal health, but as with pen-
sions it is unclear how these will be funded and the mix of public and private
provision. He has gone beyond neoliberal constraints, by signing into law
a ‘Magna Carta of the Poor’ in April 2019,8 rejected on neoliberal grounds
by his predecessor (Aquino, 2013; Chiu, 2013). The law provides, for all
those who fall below the national poverty threshold or cannot meet basic
needs, support for ‘adequate food, decent work, relevant and quality edu-
cation, housing, and the highest attainable standard of mental and physical
health’ (GOP, 2019: n.p.). However, the impoverishment of the thousands of
households that have seen their major earner killed in Duterte’s war against
drugs may well undermine any progress made through progressive social
policy.
The second big presidential win for populist politics of the right in 2016,
and much more consequential internationally, was Donald Trump’s usurpa-
tion of the Republican Party leadership and his victory in presidential elec-
tions.9 While Trump claimed to defend working and poor people, almost
from the start of his presidency he began to roll back state spending on
social welfare. Trump was the quintessential ‘outsider’; a wealthy real estate
magnate and reality television star. He first tapped into a deeply conservative
base within the Republican Party. He and his team waged a ruthless cam-
paign against Republican Party contenders, all painted as weak Washington
DC ‘insiders’ and laid out the themes that would propel his campaign in
the general election: ‘clear out the swamp’ of liberal (and criminal) elites
6. Author’s compiled data on the changing cabinet membership.
7. Republic Act 10931, ‘Universal Access to Quality Tertiary Education’; www.officialgazette.
gov.ph/downloads/2017/08aug/20170803-RA-10931-RRD.pdf
8. Republic Act 11291; www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2019/04/12/republic-act-no-11291/
9. This came on the heels of the right populist victory in the UK referendum on withdrawal
from the European Union in June 2016.
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in Washington; ‘make America great again’ by stopping and reversing the
inward migration of ‘criminals’ from Mexico and other Latin American
countries and ‘radical Muslim terrorists’; as well as by reversing the loss
of jobs and investment, by taking a hard line on China and other countries
who conduct ‘unfair trade’ and steal American intellectual property, Amer-
ican companies and especially American jobs (Hall, 2018; Trump, 2015).
In a careful study using the methods of political anthropology, Matthew
Dickinson (2018) convincingly explained how Trump won the election by
appealing to people’s anger over governing elites who were not ruling on
their behalf, storytelling and speaking in a language they could relate to.
When Trump took up office on 20 January 2017, he used the ‘bully pulpit’
of the presidency (through Twitter) to follow up on all these themes and set
out to deliver on his promises.10 From the White House, Trump continued a
discourse aimed at generating support from white working-class and middle-
class people, legitimizing white supremacists marching in Charlottesville in
August 2017 (Politico Magazine, 2018), and eventually implementing his
ban in modified form on visas from Islamic hotspots.11
The Trump administration’s approach to social policy revived far-right
discourse about the ‘lazy poor’. In April 2018, he signed an executive order
instructing all federal agencies to more strictly enforce and, where necessary,
increase work requirements for welfare recipients (Trump, 2018), in what
Paul Krugman (2018) labelled Trump’s ‘War on the Poor’. In July, the pres-
ident’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA, 2018) produced a report ad-
vocating that recipients of Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program and rental housing assistance programmes should all be required
to increase work as a condition for continuing to receive assistance. In July
2019, Trump’s Office of Management and Budget signalled a move to re-
define poverty (OMB, 2019), while the Department of Agriculture proposed
a new rule that according to its own reckoning could remove 3.1 million
households from food assistance and render thousands of children ineligible
for free school meals (USDA, 2019a, 2019b).
Trump has introduced and amplified over time an authoritarian rhetoric
from the White House, which legitimizes the actions of far-right individuals
and organizations, virtually inciting violence against minorities. He has dou-
bled down on the ‘right to bear arms’, opposing abortion, fighting terrorism,
controlling immigration and reducing access to social welfare (Lachmann,
2019). His authoritarian tendencies have been in evidence through his in-
cessant tweeting, where he attempts to bully US private companies to invest
at home, keep factories open or when he ordered US companies to find ‘an
10. Trump tweet of 20 January 2017.
11. US Executive Order 13769 (Trump, 2017a), modified as US Presidential Proclamation 9645
(Trump, 2017b) in September 2017, and approved by the US Supreme Court on 26 June
2018.
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alternative to China’.12 Trump’s discourse and actions within the limits of
his executive authority reveal his proclivity towards authoritarian govern-
ment, as do his statements supportive of rulers like Rodrigo Duterte and Jair
Bosonaro in Brazil.
In Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro won the presidency with an agenda that many saw
as combining the more draconian measures favoured by Duterte and Trump.
From day one in office he championed an assault on public sector pensions
and won Congressional support for a radical reduction in public spending,
a reform that had been resisted by previous administrations. However, the
agenda of his finance minister for further downsizing of the public sector
and regressive tax reform has met growing opposition in society.
Bolsonaro, who assumed the presidency of Brazil on 1 January 2019,
like Duterte, did so on the back of promises to jail corrupt politicians and
make it easier for the police to shoot down drug dealers. He was a long-
time outlier, a former captain in the Brazilian army, who was elected as
a Christian Democrat to Congress in 1990, where he served for 27 years
campaigning, from the social conservative fringe, against women’s rights,
abortion, gay rights, drugs liberalization and secularism. He won the presi-
dency under the banner of the far-right and long-time marginal Social Liberal
Party. He captured the support of a population disillusioned by a corruption
scandal deeply penetrating the political system, high levels of inequality,
high rates of urban crime and the impact of an economic recession. The
scale of Bolsonaro’s victory was striking, roundly defeating the Workers’
Party (PT), which once had enjoyed overwhelming support under former
President Luiz Ina´cio Lula da Silva (2003–10). Lula was jailed in 2018 on
corruption charges, but released pending appeal in late 2019. The coalition
he once commanded disintegrated during the presidency of his successor
Dilma Rousseff, who was impeached on corruption grounds in 2016, by a
Congress itself beset by corruption investigations. It was a ‘perfect storm’
that allowed Bolsonaro, who had never held any executive post and was
therefore relatively unscathed by corruption, to capture the imagination of
a majority of Brazilian voters who had come to believe their state was not
working for them.
Jair Bolsonaro, supported by evangelical Christians, used social media
to relentlessly berate minorities and call for measures outside the law to
battle crime. He had a long history of dividing the poor by targeting ethnic
minorities, famously saying in 2017 that quilombolas (residents of commu-
nities formed by the descendants of escaped black slaves) were ‘parasites’
and ‘not even good enough for procreation’ (Hunter and Power, 2019: 76;
Leal, 2017). In the election he won among all income groups except the
poor and very poor, who stayed loyal to the PT largely due to the legacy
12. Trump tweet of 23 August 2019; see: https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/116491496
0046133249
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of Bolsa Famı´lia, the conditional cash transfer programme championed by
Lula (Hunter and Power, 2019: 77).
The political crisis that led to Bolsonaro’s victory saw a meltdown of the
established political parties and dozens of marginal parties sending repre-
sentatives to Congress. This meant that Bolsonaro, upon assuming office,
unlike Duterte, could not count on a legislative majority and attempted to
rule by short-term decree (ibid.: 79). The president began an effort to cobble
together the kind of majority that Duterte enjoys in his legislature, but ini-
tially with far less success. After his first cabinet meeting, Bolsonaro’s chief
of staff, Onyx Lorenzoni, announced he had already fired 300 ‘contractors’
in his ministry and that other departments would follow suit, to ‘clean house’
targeting all those deemed sympathetic with the two previous ruling parties
referred to as ‘socialists and communists’.
Bolsonaro’s social policy began to take shape almost immediately. One of
his first decrees was to reduce the increase in the minimum wage budgeted
by his predecessor. In 2011, Bolsonaro had said ‘Bolsa Famı´lia is nothing
more than taking money from those who produce and handing it to those who
are lazy’ (Junior, 2018). During his campaign he pledged to maintain the
cash transfer programme, but by June 2019 his government began excluding
thousands of poor people from joining. The most direct action he took af-
fecting social policy was aimed at minorities. On day two of his presidency
Bolsonaro put in place a decree moving jurisdiction over indigenous lands
from Funai, the National Indigenous Foundation, to the Department of Agri-
culture, thus diminishing both indigenous and quilombolas’ participation in
the determination of land rights in favour of agribusinesses (Gonzales and
Leme, 2019). Since then, he has campaigned to eliminate the special status
of indigenous communities, which would radically cut back their access to
education and health care.
Like in the Philippines, Bolsonaro’s move towards a more authoritarian
government also has implications for social policy, as draconian anti-crime
measures target especially poor ‘non-whites’. Eight of the 22 cabinet mem-
bers he appointed were retired generals. The conservative political philoso-
pher Olavo de Carvalho, who purportedly is the president’s intellectual guru,
was reported as saying that crime would not have increased so rampantly if
the former military dictatorship had killed the right 20,000 people (Ander-
son, 2019). During his campaign, Bolsonaro argued that the only way to fight
crime was to pass out guns to the population (Leal, 2017). Two weeks into
his presidency, he signed a decree modifying the country’s ‘disarmament
statute’ of 2003, lowering the age to purchase firearms from 25 to 21 and
relaxing permit restrictions (Gonzales and Leme, 2019). Since Bolsonaro
came to office, vigilantes who have long worked closely with the police are
more active in the favelas. Newly elected governor of Rio de Janeiro, Wilson
Witzel, authorized a ‘shoot to kill’ policy in confronting armed criminals
(Anderson, 2019).
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All three countries have experienced an assault on long-established media
organizations at the hands of right populists. During the darkest years of
neoliberal reforms, the media had been a site in many countries where
governments were scrutinized. The modifications of neoliberal social policy
and the social rights agenda adopted were in no small part achieved by
civil society working through media. The rise of the right populists and
their attack on media has reduced the space for public debates over social
policy. To gain influence and attain power, all of the right populists have
not only used social media to reach their audiences, but in the process
openly attacked the established media. They labelled media organizations
that were capable of casting a critical eye over their claims and programmes
as the harbingers of ‘fake news’, the hallmark phrase popularized by Donald
Trump. Their stance toward the media is one of the clearest indications of
their authoritarian character. It not only pre-empts critical scrutiny but has
also legitimized violent attacks by their followers against journalists.
Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines has lambasted the press from
Malacan˜ang Palace, and his administration has been relentless in trying to
shut down the Rappler news service, the most effective news agency moni-
toring and reporting on his administration.13 The Philippines has been judged
‘the deadliest peacetime country for journalists, with 185 journalists killed
since 1986’ (IFJ, 2018: 39). While this did not begin with Duterte, he has be-
stowed legitimacy on these killings illustrated by his remarks shortly before
taking office, ‘Just because you’re a journalist you’re not exempted from
assassination if you’re a son of a bitch’ (ibid.: 7). President Bolsonaro was
even more extreme reportedly using ‘Twitter to criticize the press once ev-
ery three days on average’ (Gonzales and Leme, 2019). He signed a decree,
following on his decree to liberalize gun control, specifically authorizing
journalists covering crime, among others, to openly carry guns as the way to
counter the increasing threats that journalists face — a move condemned by
Reporters without Borders (2019: n.p.), who said his ‘government has been
fuelling a climate of mistrust and confrontation with the media’.
Social Exclusion of Women: Misogyny and the Attack on Women’s Rights
One of the most striking commonalities among the right populists, with
profound implications for future social policy, is the misogynist discourse
employed by all of them that has legitimized increased violence against
women and an attack on hard-won women’s rights. In the US an ‘unholy
alliance’ emerged between the less-than-pious Donald Trump and evangel-
ical Christians, based on his commitment to appoint ‘pro-life’ justices to
the Supreme Court and the wider judiciary, and to radically cut government
13. The attack has been directed particularly at internationally recognized Rappler CEO Maria
Ressa, who has been seen as a champion of the free press (IFJ, 2018).
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spending on family planning and sex education. Since in office, with the
assistance of his vice-president, Mike Pence, a hero of evangelical Chris-
tians, he has carried out his commitments and populated the Department
of Health and Human Services with committed pro-life personnel. While
Republicans have long pandered to the agenda of evangelical Christians, the
Trump administration has gone further in implementing it than any previous
administration. Similarly, in Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro had been a long-time
spokesperson of Christian evangelicals in Congress, bringing their agenda
with him to the presidency committed to rolling back women’s rights to
control their own bodies and fiercely opposing LGBTQ rights. Duterte is
cut from a different cloth, openly expressing his animosity to the powerful
Catholic Church. While in the US and Brazil, Christian evangelicals have
condemned the secular orientation of the neoliberal state and its stand on
women’s reproductive rights, in the Philippines, the Catholic Church has
been perceived as a pillar of support for the neoliberal state.
What Trump, Bolsonaro and Duterte have in common is their deeply
misogynist discourse towards women. It forms a part of their appeal to
communities who feel their traditional values and community norms have
been undermined by neoliberal elites. The crude speech directed to and
about women by all these political leaders seems designed to appeal to
communities fed up with the ‘political correctness’ propagated during the
neoliberal era. Their misogynist discourse disseminated from the ruling
heights of government has legitimized the worst forms of social exclusion
of women where violence against them is tolerated as are traditional sexual
power relations in families and communities.
Even 10 years earlier, a US politician who spoke about women in the terms
Donald Trump used before and during his electoral campaign would have
been dead in the water in any bid for the presidency. During the campaign,
the Washington Post gained access to and published the transcript of a video
recording (later released online) from 2005 capturing Trump explaining to
a ‘Hollywood Access’ host his prowess with women in openly misogynist
terms (Victor, 2017). This was just one of the crassest of scores of insulting
comments made by Trump against women, a practice that seemed to win
him votes during the campaign and not abandoned after he took up office.
One journalist collated some 60 such comments along with their sources
(Lange, 2018).
President Rodrigo Duterte is by now infamous for his vulgar statements
about women that even more explicitly provoke violence against them.
During his campaign he gave a speech referring to the kidnapping, rape and
killing of an Australian missionary who was part of a group ministering
to prisoners in Davao City where he was mayor in 1989. Duterte told the
laughing crowd that as he looked at the dead corpse of the woman, he thought
he should have been given first go at her, since she was so beautiful (Ranada,
2016). Later during his presidency, when he was sending off soldiers to fight
the Islamic armed group that captured and occupied the City of Marawi, he
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told them they could rape women, but only three: ‘I’ll take your place in
prison. If you rape 3, I’ll take the blame’ (Rappler, 2017). On still another
occasion, while speaking to troops who were off to fight the New People’s
Army, he told them not to kill the women combatants, but to shoot them in
their genitals ‘to make them useless’ (Gavilan, 2018: n.p.).
Bolsonaro demonstrated the same vitriol towards women. When he was
running for president, he was still facing a court case brought by Congress-
woman Maria do Rosario over his remarks in 2014 in the Lower House.
She had accused him of having encouraged rape and he replied ‘I wouldn’t
rape you because you don’t deserve it’, and later claimed that he was not a
rapist, but if he were, he would not rape do Rosario because ‘she is ugly’ and
‘not my type’ (Forrest, 2018). Bolsonaro’s decree loosening gun laws and
other measures taken to relax penalties against state security forces using
violence to stamp out crime are predicted to aggravate what is already a high
rate of female homicide (particularly the killing of black women) in Brazil.
Kristina Hinz, who is undertaking research on the impact of the war on
drugs in Brazil, cited a study by the Office of the Public Defender in Rio de
Janeiro, ‘The investigators even found evidence of the use of sexual violence
as a measure of retaliation: state agents raped the partners of drug traffickers
instead of arresting them’ (Hinz, 2019: n.p.). The election to high office of
politicians who propagate misogynist views is only likely to legitimize these
long-standing patterns of violence against women.
More than any other issue, the potency and danger of right populist politics
to social cohesion and the possibilities for progressive social policy lies in
their preaching of misogynist discourse. Most worrying is that this appeals
to deeply rooted patriarchal ideas still present in most societies.
CONCLUSION
When the neoliberals came to power in the early 1980s, they set out to
dismantle the universalist social policies of the preceding New Deal Order
(Fraser and Gerstle, 1989) as part of their general efforts to make the world
a more friendly place for private capital. The neoliberal era, which has seen
the ‘commodification of everything’, including social services, has created
widespread mass cynicism towards political authorities who are seen to
preach democracy but who effectively reduce deliberative space, not least
over more transformative social policy. In the old industrialized economies
of the developed world, many justifiably feel ‘left behind’, with old skilled
jobs and guaranteed pensions a thing of the past. Communities have been
fundamentally transformed by the exodus of young people or the inflow of
migrants willing to work in low-paying service jobs or high-paying jobs
requiring skills that schools in these down trodden communities no longer
produce.
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In the developing world, it is not surprising that it is in middle-income
countries like Brazil and the Philippines that right populists have gained
power. These countries are the most integrated in the global economy and
most have seen sharp increases in inequality in the neoliberal era. Indian
Prime Minister Narenda Modi’s BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), which gained
power in 2014 and was re-elected with an even bigger majority in 2019,
carries all the traits of right populist politics. The disturbing increase in xeno-
phobic attacks on migrant workers in South Africa may be an indication of its
vulnerability to the emergence of a similar sort of politics. People are justifi-
ably enraged by elites who profited from the opportunities offered by glob-
alization, but have failed to pursue transformative development in their own
countries. In both developed and developing countries, the legacies of ne-
oliberalism have created a fertile terrain for the rise of right populist politics.
The right populist leaders and organizations who have gained power in
some of the world’s most important countries, and those who are contesting
for state power in many others, threaten to undermine the slim gains that were
made under phase two neoliberalism through the recasting of social policy
in terms of market-accommodating social rights. Where the new govern-
ments led by the right populists maintain targeted social policy programmes,
they are already being transformed to allow discrimination against, or exclu-
sion of, ethnic, religious, immigrant and migrant minorities. Still worse, the
legitimation of vitriolic discourses of ethnic hatred, racism and misogyny
from the ‘bully pulpits’ of the state not only distract people’s attention from
the economic interests that lie behind these new right populists, but also
exacerbates divisions in society that make future mobilization in favour of
progressive social policy much more difficult.
The disturbing commonalities between the cases discussed in this article
are still only a foretaste of the kind of political movement that some, like
the American ideologue of the right Steve Bannon (2014), are actively
attempting to build. While Bannon played an instrumental role in getting
Trump into the White House (Wolff, 2018), since he left he has been actively
networking, particularly in Europe, to consolidate both intellectual networks
and organizational ties that could promote a more coherent and dangerous
‘authoritarian national radicalism’ of the type German sociologist, Wilhem
Heitmeyer (2019), has recently discussed. The Alternative fu¨r Deutschland
(AfD) in Germany, the Rassemblement National led by Marine Le Pen in
France and Mateo Salvini’s Lega in Italy have all gained influence in recent
years and may be major contenders for political power in the not-too-distant
future.
Right populists have not gone unchallenged by the left as evidenced in
the election campaigns in the United States and the United Kingdom. The
release of Lula da Silva on appeal may see the galvanization of a fight-back
by the left in Brazil. Future political contests are likely to be fought at least
in part on the grounds of alternative visions of social policy. At the moment,
however, the lines of confrontation in many polities appear to be between
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the neoliberal right and the challenge of right populist politics, leaving those
who aspire to develop more progressive social policy between a rock and a
hard place.
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